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Abstract
This paper analyzes the impact of reducing a subsidy on fuel in a general equilibrium model
for a fishery with heterogeneous fishing plants (vessels). It considers the impact of the stock
effect, which determines the participation of fishing plants in a likely increased stock abun-
dance. In equilibrium, the productivity of the fleet is endogenous as it depends on the stock
of fish along the equilibrium path. The model concludes that any impact of a fuel subsidy
drop will depend on the stock effect. If that effect is large, fishing firms will benefit from the
stock recovery and the elimination of the subsidy will increase future returns on investment.
The model is particularized to industrial shrimp fisheries in Mexico. It is shown that the
complete elimination of a subsidy increases biomass, capitalization, marginal productivity,
and consumption and reduces inequality when the effect of the induced increase in the stock
is considered. However, if that effect is not considered capital and consumption decrease,
and inequality increases, increasing the social costs of a fuel subsidy drop.
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1 Introduction
Subsidies in the fishing industry involve important resources and have implications on capi-
talization and on the effort of fleets. For example, Sumaila et al. (1) show that total subsidies
on fisheries were about 35 billion dollars in 2009. This is close to the earlier estimate for
2003 subsidies after adjustment for inflation (2). According to this analysis, fuel subsidies ac-
counted for 22% of total subsidies in fisheries. They also conclude that subsidies provided by
developed countries are greater (65% of the total) than those by developing countries (35%
of the total) and that Asia is the greatest subsidizing region (43% of the total), followed
by Europe (25% of the total) and North America (16% of the total). Japan provides the
highest amount of subsidies (19.7% of the total), followed by the United States and China
at 19.6% of the total. In the European Union (EU) total subsidies to the fishing sector are
equivalent to 50% of the value of the total fish catch that year (EUR 6.6 billion) and fuel
subsidies amount to half of all EU fishery subsidies. In the EU fuel subsidies take the form
of tax exemptions on fuel used for fishing.
Subsidies on fisheries have been discussed in recent meetings of the World Trade Organization
(WTO). They are seen as a threat to the sustainability of many of the world’s fisheries (3).
In these discussions the social consequences of fishery subsidies have been considered as one
of the main barriers to their removal. Those consequences are particularly relevant in less
developing countries. When analyzing these social consequences the heterogeneity of agents
is an important aspect, given that this heterogeneity is the source of inequality.
This paper analyzes the impact of reducing a subsidy on fisheries in a general equilibrium
framework, for a fishery with heterogeneous fishing plants (vessels). General equilibrium
analysis of fisheries can also be found in studies of multiple uses of the ecosystem (4). General
equilibrium models can also explain how inputs are over-allocated to an open access resource
and create a general equilibrium tragedy of the commons in artisanal fisheries (5). The model
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selected extends the one used in Da-Rocha et al. (6) to include fishing firms’ investment
decisions endogenously. Furthermore, the model is a dynamic version of Angeletos (7), in
which there are incomplete markets where fishing firms cannot insure against their future
productivity realizations.not insure against their future productivity realizations.
The analysis performed is related to that of Sumaila et al. (8), who provide a theoretical
analysis of an exogenous increase in fuel prices in a bioeconomic model. They conclude that
an increase in fuel prices (equivalent to a reduction in fuel subsidy) shifts the total cost
function upwards, whch means a reduction of effort in the competitive equilibrium where
total cost equals total revenue. They also show a similar effect of a subsidy reduction in
the single owner maximization problem. Munro and Sumaila (9) also analyze subsidies in
fisheries and show that the introduction of cost reduction subsidies has a negative impact on
the resource. They conclude that subsidies imply overexploitation even in a well-managed
fishery (by a fishery manager or in a fishery in which a fully fledged system of property rights
that rules out the commons effect has been introduced). Overall, the literature shows that
subsidy elimination has important social costs. In this paper the same result is obtained,
although as a particular case in which the stock effect is not considered. However, when
fishermen are forward-looking (that is, if the size of future stocks affects today’s decisions)
results may differ. When the stock effect is significant a reduction in overcapitalization can
be compatible with an increase in the marginal productivity of physical capital. This makes
returns more similar across fishing plants, so social costs (measured in terms of inequality)
are also reduced.
Our results provide insights that should be considered by any central authority managing
a fishery; first, in terms of how to provide management advice of future natural capital
(fish-stocks) and second on how to manage the physical capital of a fishery (fishing plants or
vessels). This gives an important message on the size of the social costs of fuel tax reductions
that supplements earlier studies (1; 2; 8; 10). To provide a numerical example, the model
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is particularised to the o provide a numerical example, the model is particularized to the
industrial shrimp fishery in Mexico, which is one of that country’s most valuable fisheries
(10).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
presents the general results from a subsidy reform obtained from the model. Section 4 shows
a numerical illustration. Section 5 discusses the policy implications and Section 6 concludes.
2 The dynamic general equilibrium model
As mentioned in Section 1, the model used is a continuous time version of Angeletos (7).
There is a continuum of households endowed with one unit of labor which holds physical
capital, k (i.e. a vessel or fishing plant with capacity k). There is idiosyncratic risk that
affects each owner of capital, which reflects what happens in any privately-held business in
a risky industry such as fishing. There are two markets in the economy: a market for final
goods and a labor market which is required to produce the final good and in which wages
are denoted by w(t). Output price is considered as a numeraire. Finally, the government
subsidizes production with a (negative) tax rate τ . Each fishing plant’s output and profit
depend on its production capacity as in Lazkano and Nostbakken (11). Their production
function depends on the size of the stock(s), X, physical capital level, k, and use of variable
inputs, n. It is assumed that natural (γ) and physical capitals (α) have the same elasticities
when α = γ. This assumption implies that in equilibrium the total harvested is given by a
Schaefer type function (12):
y = zαkαn(1−α)Xγ (1)
Individual abilities, z, are modeled as differences in individ-ual productivities between plants.
They are assumed to follow a stochastic process dz = µzzdt + σzdω, where Eω = 0 and
dω2 = σ2dt
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The representative household’s utility function is given by:
max
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtu(c)dt
where c is private consumption. It is assumed that 0 < ρ < 1 and that utility (u) is continu-
ously differentiable, strictly concave, and monotonically increasing. A constant relative risk
aversion (CRRA) utility function is used:
u(c) =
c1−σ
1− σ ,
where the parameter σ measures the degree of relative risk aversion.
The intertemporal consumer’s problem is given by:
v(z, k, t) = max
c,k
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−ρtu(c)dt
]
(2)
s.t :
dk =
[
max
n
{(1 + τ)y − wn− δk}+ w − c+ T
]
dt,
y = zαkαn(1−α)Xα,
dz = µzdt+ σzdω,
c, k ≥ 0.
Equation 2 shows how consumers maximize utility given their expectations on the natural
capital stock of X. The stock of capital affects the total factor productivity of the industry
at all times. A larger stock increases profitability and raises the incentives to invest.
It is assumed that fishing possibilities are managed by announcing a path of mortality of fish.
This path is a harvest control rule (HCR) that supports the equilibrium. HCRs are a set
of pre-agreed rules used to determine a management response to changes in the indicators
of stock status with respect to reference points with the objective of moving or maintaining
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the exploitation level of stocks to pre-defined levels. There is an output path associated with
the HCR that supports the beliefs of fishermen about the trajectory of the stock. Therefore,
the role of the HCR in this model is to guarantee the unicity of equilibrium.
The natural resource follows an age structured dynamic model as in (6), with the following
conservation law (13; 14):
∂n(a, t)
∂t
= −∂n(a, t)
∂a
− [m(a) + p(a)F (t)]n(a, t). (3)
where n(a, t) is the number of fish of age (a) at time t. Therefore, the stock abundance
function is defined as:
X(t) =
∫ A
0
ω(a)n(a, t)da. (4)
where ω is the weight at age. Finally, it is assumed that fish die at age A.
3 Results
Conditional on z, k and X, individual profits are obtained by solving an intra-temporal
optimization problem. Each fishing plant solves:
R(w, τ,X)zk − δk ≡ max
n
(1 + τ)y − wn− δk
where R(w, τ,X) = α(1 + τ)1/α
[
(1−α)
w
](1−α)/α
X and δ is the depreciation rate. Notice that
R(w, τ,X) is increasing in X. Note also that profit per fishing plant is given by:
pi(τ, z, k,X) = α(1 + τ)1/α
[
(1− α)
w
](1−α)/α
X︸ ︷︷ ︸
R(w,τ,X)
zk
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Yield per fishing plant is given by
y(τ, z, k,X) =
pi(τ, z, k,X)
α(1 + τ)
=
R(w, τ,X)
α(1 + τ)
zk = q(τ, w)zkX︸ ︷︷ ︸
' Schaefer (1954)
And, given a measure g(z, k, t), total effort is given by:
K =
∫
zkg(z, k, t)dkdz.
Therefore, capital evolves according to:
dk = [R(w, τ,X)zk − δk + w − c+ T ] dt.
Given X(t), w(t) and τ , R(w, τ,X) can be computed and a representative household chooses
its consumption, c and physical capital, k, by solving the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
equation:
ρv(z, k, t) = u(c) + i(z, k, t)
∂
∂k
v(z, k, t) +
+µ
∂
∂z
v(z, k, t)
σ2z
2
∂2
∂z2
v(z, k, t) +
∂
∂t
v(z, k, t)
where, (5)
u′(c) =
∂
∂k
v(z, k, t).
where i(z, k, t) is the investment rate, given by
i(z, k, t) = R(w, τ,X)zkX − δk + w + T − (u′)−1
[
∂
∂k
v(z, k, t)
]
The distribution of fishing plants is determined endogenously by the optimal investment
decisions made by fishing-plants themselves. To find the mass of plants, g(z, k, t), the
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 g(z, k, t) death
Incumbents at time t ↗
g(z, k, t) ↘
(1− ) g(z, k, t) survivors
↓
Incumbents at time t+dt
(1− ) g(z, k, t) +  gss(z, k)
↑
entrants  gss(z, k)
Figure 1: Fleet dynamics explained: how new entrants have the productivity level of the
fishing plants in the steady state.
Kolmogorov-Fokker-Planck (KFP) equation is applied:
∂
∂t
g(z, k, t) = − ∂
∂k
[i(z, k, t)g(z, k, t)]− ∂
∂z
[µzg(z, k, t)] +
∂2
∂z2
[
σ2z
2
g(z, k, t)
]
(6)
+ [g(z, k, t)− ge(z, k, t)]
They entry decisions of new fishing plants are based on future (expected) productivity (Figure
1): ge(z, k, t) = gss(z, k). This function depends on stock and is therefore endogenously
determined by the decisions of fishing plants.
3.1 Subsidy drop with no stock effect
Assume that in Eq. (1) γ = 0, which implies no stock effect (see, for example, Clark and
Munro (15) for some economic implications of this assumption). Define H(Xˆ) as the harvest
level compatible with keeping the stock at Xˆ. Figure 2 presents the equilibrium effects of
a drop in the subsidy if the stock has no effect on fishermen’s decisions. The drop in the
subsidy reduces profits and total catches (from Q∗τ>0 to Q
∗
τ=0). After the subsidy reduction
8
H(X), Q
H(X)
X∗τ=0X
∗
τ>0
Q∗τ>0
X
Q∗τ=0
A
B
Qτ>0 =
∫
y(z, k,X)g(z, k,X)dzdk
Figure 2: General equilibrium impact of a subsidy drop with no stock effect. A is the steady
state equilibrium with positive subsidies and B is the steady state without subsidies.
H(X) > Q∗τ=0, this increases the stock up to H(X) = Q
∗
τ=0. However, as the stock has no
effect on the decisions of fishing plants the new equilibrium corresponds to a higher stock
X∗τ=0 with the same catches Q
∗
τ=0. In Figure 2 this is represented by point B.
With no stock effect after taxes catches are reduced (if the number of fishing plants is
constant) and income per plant is lower than the pre-subsidy level reform.
3.2 Subsidy drop with stock effect
Consider now that in Eq. (1) γ = α, (Figure 3) in which the stock effect plays a role. In
equilibrium, X is given by the stationary population and profits are:
pi(τ,X0) = (1 + τ)
1/α
[
(1− α)
w
](1−α)/α
z(t)k(t)X0
If τ = 0, profits would be the same as before if X1 = (1 + τ)
1/αX0 as
pi(0, X1) =
[
(1− α)
w
](1−α)/α
z(t)k(t) (1 + τ)1/αX0︸ ︷︷ ︸
X1
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H(X), Q
H(X)
Q =
∫∫
y(z, k,X)g(z, k,X)dzdk
(1 + τ)1/αX∗τ>0 X
∗
τ=0X
∗
τ>0
Q∗τ>0
X
(1 + τ)Q∗τ>0
Q∗τ=0
A
A’
B
Figure 3: General equilibrium impact of a subsidy drop with stock effect. A is the steady
state equilibrium with positive subsidies, A′ is the non-equilibrium situation if investment is
constant, and B is the steady state without subsidies.
Catches are increased by a factor of (1 + τ) (as yield per fishing plant is given by y(τ,X) =
pi(τ,X)
α(1+τ)
, and in this case τ = 0 but profits are kept constant). In other words the subsidy is
dropped and there is an increment in the stock that generates the same decisions on capital
and employment (with the same investment decisions) but more output due to the stock
effect. However, in this case all revenues come from catches, as there are no subsidies.
3.3 Comparing a subsidy drop with and without stock effect
In Figures 2 and 3, points A are the steady state equilibrium with positive subsidies. If the
subsidy is eliminated investment will be constant if Xˆ(t) = (1 + τ)1/αX(t). But that implies
that catches increase to (1 + τ)Q∗τ>0. This would correspond to point A
′. This cannot be
an equilibrium given that H((1 + τ)1/αX∗τ>0) > (1 + τ)Q
∗
τ>0 implies that ∆X > 0. The
new steady state without subsidies is reached at point B , where the stock and catches are
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higher. Finally, it should be noticed that final catches are higher with the stock effect than
without it.
With the stock effect (Figure 3) catches and income per vessel are increased if stock is greater
than (1 + τ)1/αX∗τ>0. After the subsidy reform total harvest, Q
∗
τ=0 and the biomass recovery,
X∗τ=0), are higher (lower) with the stock effect than without it.
In order to understand the role of the stock effect, assume that fish stock has no effect on fleet
productivity. That is, with no stock effect vessel productivity after the tax reform remains
constant and the transitional dynamic of the competitive equilibrium is independent of the
stock path recovery. The impact of the subsidy drop on the fleet is therefore determined by
its effect on individual investment, and the immediate effect of the change in the subsidy is a
reduction in individual investment. In the model the equilibrium outcome for each individual
is independent of the number of vessels (given that there are no fixed costs). Capital and
output will be lower and consumption will fall, both during the transition and in the final
stationary state.
The effect on total capital will depend on whether or not entry in the fishery is incentivized.
If the number of vessels is kept constant, output will be reduced and there will be a larger
stock. However, this larger stock does not benefit the fleet. Fishermen’s income is lower
given that they lose the subsidy. In that case, the redistributive impact of the subsidy
drop will be regressive. Reducing investment increases inequality because investment is the
way of reducing idiosyncratic inequality. Therefore even though overcapitalization of firms
is reduced, agents are worse off after the subsidy reduction. Therefore the social cost of
eliminating the subsidy is high.
When the stock of fish affects fleet productivity, in equilibrium, the stock is endogenous
(and so is the productivity of the firms). Therefore, the impact of a drop in the subsidy will
actually depend on the stock effect. If this effect is large, individuals will benefit from stock
recovery, as the elimination of the subsidy will increase future returns on investment. The
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effect on fishing plants is similar to an increase in their permanent income. Part of future
revenues is used to increase present consumption and can offset the drop in income resulting
from the elimination of the subsidy. Finally, as shown in the numerical illustration below,
when the stock effect is considered inequality is also reduced.
4 A numerical illustration
The model presented is illustrated using the industrial shrimp fishery, which is one of the
most valuable fisheries in Mexico (10). The stock dynamic is calibrated using data from
Gracia and Vazquez-Bader (16). The calibration strategy used is based on the assumption
that the benchmark economy is at half of the maximum sustainable yield mortality level,
Ysq =
1
2
Ymsy, (17).
Table 1: Calibration of the Benchmark Economy
Parameter Value Statistic
α 1/3 Capital share (Gollin (18))
σ 2.5 Moderate risk aversion (Bluffstone and Khlin (19))
 0.04 Vessel Lifetime (FAO (20))
corr(zt, zt−1) 0.8031 MgPK ' 1%
σ2z 0.0121 Variance (Da-Rocha and Sempere (21))
δ 0.1181 R(w, τ,X)− δ ' ρ
τ 0.25 Subsidy (Cisneros et al. (10))
The capital share, α, is 1/3 (18); the discount rate, ρ, is 0.04, (6); and the relative risk
aversion parameter, σ, is 2.5, corresponding to a situation of moderate risk aversion (19).
It is assumed that the cross section productivity heterogeneity is generated by an Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck process, i.e. an AR(1) in discrete time, with variance of 1.21%, (21). The produc-
tivity process correlation is equal to 0.80 to generate a low capital return, ∂Y
∂K
, of 1.03%. Note
that this value implies the existence of an overcapitalized fleet in the baseline economy, i.e.
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∂Y
∂K
= α Y
K
< ρˆ. The depretiation rate, δ, is set at 11.81% to generate a profitability per unit
vessel close to the discount rate, i.e. R(w, τ,X)− δ ' ρ. Each fishing plant is considered to
have a life span of 25 years (20), which implies an entry rate, , of 0.04. Finally, the subsidy
(τ) is set equal to 0.25 (10). Table 2 summarizes the calibration paramethers.
As shown in Section 3, , the effects of the fish stock on the decisions of fishing plants are
important for assessing the subsidy drop. The importance of this effect is an empirical
question. In fact, the reports available on the size of the stock effect are ambiguous. The
stock effect based on a Schaefer-type model (stock elasticity of 1) is the maximum effect (22).
This implies that in real life situations weaker stock effects are to be found. The effect will
depend on the target stock and/or the gear used. For example, the stock effect is weak for
herring in the North Sea (23), ] but significant for trawl fisheries in Norway (24). This is why
three different scenarios are compared: a 0.25 subsidy (τ = 0.25), which implies that 25% of
output is subsidized, and two versions of a zero subsidy scenario (τ = 0) which corresponds
to a situation in where the subsidy is eliminated. The two altenatives assessed are with the
stock effect (α = γ) and without it (γ = 0).
Figure 4 shows the transitional dynamics of several variables when stock effect is not consid-
ered (upper panel) and when it is considered (lower panel). Expectations can be considered
as rational if expectations on X(t) satisfy stock dynamics given by Eq. 4). satisfy the stock
dynamics given by Eq. 4). The main conclusion for the case with stock effect is that wages
(after an initial drop), capital, consumption, profits (after an initial drop), and yield all
increase. The upper panel of Figure 4 shows that if there is no stock effect capital, consump-
tion, and captures decrease, and profits decrease and never reach the pre-subsidy reform
level. Notice also that the transition is longer with the stock effect than without it.
Table 2 shows the numerical results in the steady state of a fuel subsidy reform. It provides
results on stock sustainability, prices (i.e. wages), aggregates (capital and production), cap-
ital productivity, inequality (in terms of income and consumption), and total consumption.
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Figure 4: Transitions to the steady state from a subsidy drop. With no stock effect (upper
panel) and with stock effect (lower panel), for production (Y ), capital (K), productivity
(MgPK), and consumption (C).
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Table 2: Steady state indicators calculated using the Shrimp fishery of Mexico, for the three
scenarios analyzed: fuel sub-sidized ((τ = 0.25) and no subsidised (τ = 0), with (α = γ) and
without stock effect (γ = 0).
τ = 0.25 τ = 0
Benchmark with without
Economy Stock effect Stock effect
Sustainability
Relative Y 1.0000 1.9985 0.9006
Relative X (SSB) 1.0000 5.6986 13.7970
X/Xmax 0.1614 0.9197 2.2266
Prices
wage w 1.3488 2.1959 0.7201
R(w, τ,X)− δ 0.0410 0.0570 0.0389
Aggregates
K 4.2033 5.9224 3.0642
Y 1.6185 3.2346 1.4576
Profitability
K/Y 2.5970 1.8310 0.8469
MgPK=
∂Y
∂K
− δ 0.0103 0.0640 0.0404
Inequality1
Income (Gini) 1.0000 0.3476 1.5075
Consumption (Gini) 1.0000 0.5580 1.2382
Relative Total
Human Consumption 1.0000 2.4220 0.7464
Table 1 should be read relative to the τ = 0.25 scenario and it reflects the differences be-
tween considering and not considering the stock effect. Production when the stock effect
is considered is almost doubled while stock size is increased. Over-capitalization (K/Y ) is
also clear with the fuel subsidy. When the subsidy is removed over-capitalization decreases,
and the productivity of capital is higher when if the stock effect is considered than it is not.
Finally, an important result for assessing the social costs of subsidy drops emerges from the
Gini coefficient.1 A subsidy drop when there is no stock effect increases inequality, but when
1The Gini coefficient is a measure of statistical dispersion intended to represent the income and con-
sumption distribution of among fishing plants and consumers, respectively, and is the most commonly used
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there is a stock effect inequality decreases in terms of both income and consumption. This
result may have important management and policy implications, as discussed below.
5 Policy implications
The World Bank (25) shows that the difference between the potential and actual net eco-
nomic benefits from world marine fisheries is approximately 50 billion dollars per annum.
It states that improvements in regulation of marine fisheries are needed to capture part of
these losses. One of the World Bank’s claims is that successful reforms will require reduction
or elimination of some of the subsidies in the sector, especially those leading to overcapacity
and over-fishing. This same background is one of the reasons that leads the WTO to analyze
and propose the removal of such subsidies. It discusses differential treatment for developing
countries and proposes technical assistance and transition periods to address their institu-
tional and financial constraints in changing subsidy policies. WTO discussion on subsidies
on fisheries continues with no definitive agreement to date. According to Sumaila et al. (26)
the failure of the negotiations is due to the fact that WTO negotiators aim for results in
an all-inclusive deal for all maritime WTO member countries and for all fisheries (indepen-
dently of whether they are domestic or international, small or large scale and developing or
developed country fisheries).Such an all-inclusive deal is hard to attain because it is difficult
to align the incentives of all the parties involved.
The World Bank claims that the problem is based on the political economy of reform. Any
successful reform needs to be built on a consensus among fishermen as to the transition pro-
cess (especially as regards socially compensatory policies to manage transitions equitably).
Convincing the parties involved that the elimination of subsidies does not entail major social
costs would no doubt reduce the political obstacles to such reform and would align incen-
measure of inequality. In the numerical example a relative Gini coefficient was used (possitve subsidy=1) to
obtain the relative change to this basecase.
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tives for governments. In fact, the dividends would be two-fold: On one hand, some of the
”sunken billions” would be recovered and on the other hand the fiscal burden of subsidies
would be reduced in many countries.
In light of these considerations, four policy implications arise in the modeling framework
presented, related to the social costs of reducing fishery subsidies:
i) With the stock effect, a central authority plays the essential role of designing an HCR
that selects the right equilibrium. That is, with endogenous fleet productivity the com-
petitive equilibrium depends on the future stock path,which must be made sustainable
through an HCR. A fishing policy using an HCR plays a role similar to that of mone-
tary policy in macroeconomic models by ruling out multiple equilibria and selecting a
single equilibrium. This role is not necessary in an economy with no stock effect;
ii) If the stock effect is significant it is important to allow the fleet to evolve, replacing
old vessels by new ones. This is required to make the present effort reduction (whch
contributes to stock rehabilitation) compatible with enjoying the future benefits of
stock recovery. Increases in fleet capacity have to be take place through the substitution
of less powerful small vessels by more powerful larger vessels as the stock is recovering;
iii) Inequalities in income and consumption when the stock effect is considered are reduced,
which helps align the incentives of all parties involved in subsidy drop negotiations;
iv) Complete elimination of a subsidy increases capitalization, marginal productivity, and
consumption if the effect of the induced increase in stock (biomass) is considered.
However, if this effect is not taken into account capital and consumption decrease
and never reach the pre-subsidy reform level. This implies that side compensation
payments could be lower than expected if there is a stock effect.
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6 Conclusions
Subsidizing fishing effort in an already overexploited ecosystem will further damage it, con-
tinually diminishing the long-term productivity of the system. This is why analyzing the
impact of eliminating a fuel subsidy in a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents
as presented in this paper is a relevant policy exercise. In equilibrium, fleet productivity is
endogenous as it depends on the stock of fish along the equilibrium path. If the stock effect
is large individuals will benefit from stock recovery, as the elimination of the subsidy will
increase future returns on investment.
The model is applied to analyze the elimination of a subsidy in the industrial shrimp fish-
eries in Mexico and the results show that the complete elimination of a subsidy increases
biomass, capitalization, marginal productivity, and consumption if the effect of the induced
increase in the stock of shrimp is considered. However, if this effect is not taken into account
capital and consumption decrease and marginal productivity never reaches the pre-subsidy
level. Therefore, the effect of the increase in stock due to the removal of subsidies is a very
important determinant of other relevant economic variables.
Once all effects are taken into account the social cost of removing a subsidy can be smaller
in fishery industries than in other industries. This is because of the greater abundance of
natural capital available to the fishing industry due to the subsidy reform, which creates a
second general equilibrium effect. The political cost of a reform reducing subsidies would
therefore also be smaller. Furthermore, if the stock effect is relevant it is important to allow
the fleet to evolve, replacing old vessels by new ones. Increases in fleet capacity have to take
place through the substitution of less powerful small vessels by more powerful larger vessels
as the stock is recovering.
It can be concluded that if the stock effect is taken into account the change in socioeconomic
conditions due to the subsidy drop will not be negative in general. This means that the
18
need for socially compensatory policies may be lower than expected in traditional analyses
of subsidies. Furthermore, all-in, inclusive negotiation can be further facilitated by the lower
inequality obtained in terms of both income and consumption.
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A Mathematical representation of the economy
A.1 Market clearance
It should be noted that the labour market satisfies:∫
n(z, k, t)g(z, k, t)dkdz = 1 (7)
and, total catches (Q(t)), are: ∫
y(z, k, t)g(z, k, t)dkdz = Q(t) (8)
A.2 Definition of equilibrium
Given a subsidy, τ , an equilibrium is a stock function, X(t) (Eq. (4)), a measure of firms g(z, k, t),
wages w(t), value functions v(z, k, t), individual decision rules n(z, k, t), y(z, k, t), and investment
rates i(z, k, t), such that:
i) (Firm optimization) Given the stock dynamics process, ν(t), and prices w(t), v(z, k, t) solve
the household problem, Eq. (6), and n(z, k, t), y(z, k, t) and the saving rates s(z, k, t) are
optimal policy functions.
ii) (Firm measure) g(z, k, t), satisfies Eq. (7);
iii) (Market clearing-feasibility) Given individual decision rules, and the firms measure, we find
w, solving Eq. (7).
iv) (Harvest Control Rule) Rational expectations on resource dynamics. Given aggregate har-
vest, X(t) satisfies the stock dynamics (8).
A.3 Steady state
The economy in the steady state can be represented by the following system of equations:
ρv(z, k,X) = u(c) + i(z, k,X)
∂
∂k
v(z, k,X) + µ
∂
∂z
v(z, k,X) +
σ2z
2
∂2
∂z2
2
v(z, k,X),
u′(c) =
∂
∂k
v(z, k,X),
0 = − ∂
∂k
[i(z, k)g(z, k,X)]− ∂
∂z
[µzg(z, k,X)]
+
∂2
∂z2
[
σ2z
2
g(z, k,X)
]
,
1 =
∫
n(z, k)g(z, k,X)dzdk.
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